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Along with the increased interest in and volume of social cognition research, there has been higher
awareness of a lack of agreement on the concepts and taxonomy used to study social processes. Two
central concepts in the field, empathy and Theory of Mind (ToM), have been identified as overlapping
umbrella terms for different processes of limited convergence. Here, we review and integrate evidence
of brain activation, brain organization, and behavior into a coherent model of social-cognitive processes.
We start with a meta-analytic clustering of neuroimaging data across different social-cognitive tasks.
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Results show that understanding others’ mental states can be described by a multilevel model of
hierarchical structure, similar to models in intelligence and personality research. A higher level describes
more broad and abstract classes of functioning, whereas a lower one explains how functions are applied to
concrete contexts given by particular stimulus and task formats. Specifically, the higher level of our model
suggests 3 groups of neurocognitive processes: (a) predominantly cognitive processes, which are engaged
when mentalizing requires self-generated cognition decoupled from the physical world; (b) more affective
processes, which are engaged when we witness emotions in others based on shared emotional, motor, and
somatosensory representations; (c) combined processes, which engage cognitive and affective functions in
parallel. We discuss how these processes are explained by an underlying principal gradient of structural brain
organization. Finally, we validate the model by a review of empathy and ToM task interrelations found in
behavioral studies.
Public Significance Statement
Empathy and Theory of Mind are important human capacities for understanding others. Here, we
present a meta-analysis of neuroimaging data from 4,207 participants, which shows that these
abilities can be deconstructed into specific and partially shared neurocognitive subprocesses. Our
findings provide systematic, large-scale support for the hypothesis that understanding others’ mental
states can be described by a multilevel model of hierarchical structure, similar to models in
intelligence and personality research.
Keywords: emotion, mentalizing, mirror neurons, perspective taking, social cognition
Supplemental materials: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/bul0000303.supp
Successful social interaction requires representing not only the
overt behavior of people but also its underlying forces such as
thoughts and emotions. Over the last two decades, behavioral and
brain imaging research has generated an abundance of evidence on
how we manage to infer the unobservable mental states of others.
At the same time, there has been increasing awareness of a lack of
agreement regarding the concepts and taxonomy used to study
these social processes. Clearly, different terms are being used to
describe similar processes and, at times, similar terms for describ-
ing different processes (see Happé, Cook, & Bird, 2017). In
particular, two terms have been of central importance—empathy,
generally referring to an affective route for understanding others
(Gallese, 2003; Titchener, 1909), and Theory of Mind (ToM) or
mentalizing, referring to cognitive representations of others’ men-
tal states (Adolphs, 2009; Kanske, 2018; Keysers & Gazzola,
2009; Premack & Woodruff, 1978). On a conceptual level, it has
been argued that both are used as umbrella terms for studying a
variety of different processes of limited convergence (see
Schaafsma, Pfaff, Spunt, & Adolphs, 2015, for ToM; see Bloom,
2017; Zaki, 2017, for empathy). This observation has also been
reflected in recent literature reviews. Rather than finding broad
and homogeneous networks, meta-analyses that explicitly cat-
egorized studies based on stimuli and instructions found mul-
tiple functional subdivisions among the neural correlates for
ToM (Molenberghs, Johnson, Henry, & Mattingley, 2016;
Schurz, Radua, Aichhorn, Richlan, & Perner, 2014; see also
Mar, 2011; Van Overwalle, 2009; Van Overwalle & Baetens,
2009) and empathy (Fan, Duncan, de Greck, & Northoff, 2011;
Gu, Hof, Friston, & Fan, 2013; Lamm, Decety, & Singer, 2011;
Timmers et al., 2018).
The issues illustrated above are compounded by the fact that
empathy and ToM are both thought to comprise affective and
cognitive subforms, complicating the distinction between the
terms. For instance, definitions of ToM include the ability to make
inferences not only about others’ cognitive mental states, such as
beliefs and thoughts, but also about their desires and emotions
(e.g., Frith & Frith, 2006; Premack & Woodruff, 1978). The latter
feature has sometimes been referred to as “affective ToM” (e.g.,
Kalbe et al., 2010; Schlaffke et al., 2015; Sebastian et al., 2012;
Shamay-Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz, 2007). Relatedly, it was pro-
posed that the processing of others’ mental states engages ToM,
irrespective of cognitive or affective content, whenever it requires
metarepresentation (Leslie, Friedman, & German, 2004), that is,
representing a propositional attitude (e.g., “Sally is happy that . . .”,
or “Sally wants that . . .”). On the other hand, definitions of
empathy contain emotional processes such as the sharing of others’
feelings as well as cognitive processes such as reasoning about
others’ affective states (e.g., Dziobek et al., 2011; Shamay-Tsoory,
Aharon-Peretz, & Perry, 2009), referred to as “cognitive empathy”
(Hooker, Verosky, Germine, Knight, & D’Esposito, 2010; Walter,
2012). Even broader conceptualizations of empathy contain addi-
tional features such as empathic concern or compassion for another
person (Davis, 1994; see also Zaki & Ochsner, 2012). These
variable models of empathy and ToM challenge an integration of
findings across different fields and labs.
An important step to clarify current theories of social cognition
is determining how different concepts relate to one another (e.g., in
a multilayered manner; De Waal, 2012; see also De Waal, 2007;
Preston & Hofelich, 2012: Singer, 2006) and exploring how they
are best grouped according to common underlying processes
(Happé et al., 2017). This approach also advances a “deconstruc-
tion” of social processes (see Schaafsma et al., 2015), that is, the
mapping of broad terms such as ToM and empathy to a set of
underlying processes that are in turn linked to concrete experimen-
tal tasks. Such an endeavor also dovetails with the strategy pro-























































































































294 SCHURZ ET AL.
studying mental disorders (Insel et al., 2010)—the Research Do-
main Criteria (RDoC) Projects.
We begin our article with a meta-analysis of neuroimaging
studies and then move on to review the corresponding behavioral
findings. Neuroimaging data provide a useful starting point be-
cause brain activity reported in standard space is readily compa-
rable across studies and can be used to generate a comprehensive
picture of task-by-task interrelations (i.e., activation overlaps).
This serves as a framework for reviewing behavioral studies on
task-by-task correlations. Building on previous meta-analytic work
(Schurz et al., 2014), we sorted studies according to stimuli and
task instructions. In the present study, we included task groups not
only from the ToM literature (e.g., False Belief, Reading the Mind
in the Eyes tasks) but also from the field of empathy (e.g.,
Observing Pain, Evaluating Situated Emotions tasks). A central
additional feature of the present study is a hierarchical clustering
of meta-analytic results (see Laird et al., 2011; Riedel et al., 2015).
Specifically, after obtaining meta-analytic result maps for each
task group, we determined their overlaps (via image correlation)
and clustered similar maps together. This produced a hierarchical
tree (dendrogram), which characterizes relations among brain ac-
tivation networks for different task groups.
The main goal of this clustering is to estimate latent factors, that
is, common neurocognitive components engaged by different em-
pathy and ToM tasks, which is in line with previous perspectives
on empathy and ToM (e.g., De Waal, 2007; Preston & Hofelich,
2012). In theory, components engaged by different tasks could be
related in various forms. Multiple components could largely over-
lap, one component could be a subcomponent of another, or
components could have some elements in common but addition-
ally contain distinct processes (see Happé et al., 2017, for discus-
sion). The clustering tree we generated is flexible enough to capture
any of these relations. Identifying common components is also sup-
ported by the argument that whatever is pivotal for social cognition as
measured in empathy and ToM studies should be reflected in common
activation across several tasks. This way, activation driven by idio-
syncratic elements of task design is ruled out by the overlap (see Mar,
2011). In addition, our clustering across empathy and ToM tasks
clarifies theories of subprocesses for these domains. To illustrate,
cognitive empathy and affective ToM could represent two indepen-
dent and self-contained social abilities or could be overlapping and to
some extent redundant concepts.
Method
Literature Search and Study Selection
We reviewed the neuroimaging literature on ToM and empa-
thy to get an overview of the different experimental tasks that
were used and sorted studies with similar stimuli and instruc-
tions into task groups. All studies from ToM and empathy task
groups were retrieved from database searches using PubMed
and ISI Web of Science (core collection). Our review included
literature published up to November 2019. Neuroimaging stud-
ies were identified by the keywords neuroimaging or fMRI or
PET and were assigned to ToM groups when they included
theory of mind or mentalizing or mindreading and to empathy
groups when they included empathy, or empathetic, or altruism,
or sympathy, or emotional contagion, or compassion. For ToM,
we incorporated the literature from a previous meta-analysis
(Schurz et al., 2014) into the present sample. Articles were
retained if they matched one of the empathy and ToM task
groups defined previously, irrespective of the terminology used
by the authors. All studies included in the task groups had to further
fulfill the following selection criteria (see Radua et al., 2012): Re-
ported coordinates had to correspond to standard space (MNI or TAL)
and stem from whole-brain analysis using a consistent threshold
throughout the whole brain. Data from clinical samples were re-
moved. If a study reported more than one contrast, the one that best
corresponded to the other studies from the task group was selected.
Altogether, we included 103 studies from the ToM literature divided
into six task groups: False Belief (n  25), Trait Judgments (n  19),
Strategic Games (n  13), Rational Actions (n  11), Social Ani-
mations (n  20), and Reading the Mind in the Eyes (n  15). We
identified 85 studies from the empathy literature that we divided into
five task groups: Observing Pain (n  21), Observing Emotions (n 
25), Sharing Emotions or Pain (n  12), Evaluating Situated Emo-
tions (n  15), and Reasoning about Emotions (n  12). Thus, our
meta-analyses cover a total of 188 studies.
Meta-Analysis Methods
For each of the 11 task groups, we carried out an effect-size-
based meta-analysis using the Signed Differential Mapping
method (SDM 4.31, Radua et al., 2012, www.sdmproject.com).
The SDM method is based on the positive features from existing
peak probability methods for meta-analysis, such as activation
likelihood estimation (ALE, Eickhoff et al., 2016) or multilevel
kernel density analysis (MKDA, Wager, Lindquist, & Kaplan,
2007). In addition, it incorporates the effect sizes of reported
activations, thus extracting more detailed information from the
published literature. Based on t values and sample sizes re-
ported in studies, SDM creates effect-size (Hedge’s g values)
and variance maps (derived from the distribution of effect
sizes).1 Statistical significance of meta-analytic maps was as-
sessed by permutation tests that randomize the location of the
voxels within the standard gray-matter template. One hundred
random maps were generated by permutation for each meta-
analysis. We report all results for the MNI space and at a
statistical threshold of p  .005 uncorrected (voxel-level) and a
cluster threshold of 10 voxels (see Figures 1 and 2). This
threshold was found to optimally balance sensitivity and spec-
ificity and to be an approximate equivalent to a corrected
threshold of p  .05 in original neuroimaging studies (Radua et
al., 2012). For contrasts between meta-analyses, we used the
SDM linear model function, calculating the difference between
effect-size estimates from two meta-analyses while accounting
for differences in sample size and within- and between-study
1 Hedge’s g values are derived from t statistics or equivalently from p
values or z scores. Effect sizes around reported peak coordinates ( 20
mm) are estimated based on an anisotropic un-normalized Gaussian kernel.
The mean brain activity for each task group is determined by a random-
effects model, with each study being weighted by the inverse of the sum of
its variance plus an estimate of between-study heterogeneity (DerSimonian
& Laird, 1986). This enables studies with larger sample sizes or lower























































































































295TOWARD A HIERARCHICAL MODEL OF SOCIAL COGNITION
variability. To determine common activation in multiple con-
trasts, we applied conjunction minimum analysis (e.g., Nichols,
Brett, Andersson, Wager, & Poline, 2005) via the image calcu-
lator utility of SPM12 (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk). Note that, as the
ultimate goal of our meta-analyses was to cluster result-maps
based on similarities in whole-brain activation patterns, we did
not carry out analyses of publication bias.2
Hierarchical Clustering Analysis
After obtaining meta-analytic result maps for all 11 task groups,
we applied agglomerative hierarchical clustering to them (see, e.g.,
Laird et al., 2015; Riedel et al., 2015, 2018). Searching for a
hierarchical structure is consistent with several previous concep-
tualizations of social cognition as a multilayered or multilevel
phenomenon (De Waal, 2012; Preston & De Waal, 2002;
Schaafsma et al., 2015; Singer, 2006). To our knowledge, this is
the first clustering of SDM effect-size meta-analysis maps. There-
fore, we compared several settings for discriminative performance
(see the online supplemental materials) and found unthresholded
effect-size maps (Hedges’ g) and Pearson correlation coefficients
to best capture image dissimilarity among our meta-analyses.
Clustering consisted of three steps. In Step 1, we transformed the
unthresholded meta-analytic effect-size maps into feature vectors
containing voxel values and concatenated them horizontally, form-
ing a matrix of n task groups (i.e., 11) and p voxels (i.e., 902629).
Based on these, we calculated pairwise Pearson correlation coef-
ficients between all feature vectors, from which we derived an
n-by-n dissimilarity matrix (1  r values) reflecting whole-brain
multivoxel dissimilarity between maps. In Step 2, we grouped
meta-analyses into clusters by applying agglomerative hierarchical
clustering in MATLAB 8.1 (The Math Works, Inc., 2013). For
linkage, we selected the linkage average method, which represents
a compromise between the clustering’s sensitivity to outliers and
its tendency to form long chains of elements per cluster. As a
2 Our meta-analytic clustering is based on patterns (i.e., data-vectors)
which capture activation across thousands of brain locations, that have
been computed separately for 11 task types. As publication bias in neuro-
imaging studies can be region- and task-specific, an estimation thereof
would produce a very high number of possible sub-analyses. Although
such an extensive analysis goes beyond the scope of our meta-analytic
clustering project, further work is needed to systematically address publi-
cation bias in the social neurosciences.
Figure 1. Results of separate meta-analyses for task groups from Theory of Mind. Maps were thresholded at
a voxel-wise threshold of p  .005 uncorrected and a cluster extent threshold of 10 voxels. See the online article























































































































296 SCHURZ ET AL.
distance measure, we selected euclidean, which considers both the
profile and magnitudes of task-to-task similarities. Euclidean is
among the most widely used distance measures and the default setting
for MATLAB’s hierarchical clustering. In Step 3, we evaluated
different solutions based on the dendrogram from our clustering.
Based on previous works (e.g., Laird et al., 2015; Riedel et al.,
2015, 2018) we relied on two metrics for this step: (a) cophenetic
distance and (b) density of task separation. Figure 3 shows both
measures for different clustering solutions; Figure 4 shows the
underlying dendrogram. The cophenetic distance between clusters
at a given model order (i.e., number of clusters) reflects dissimi-
larity between subclusters.3 A clustering optimum is indicated by
high difference in cophenetic distances when moving from lower
to higher model orders as this indicates that introducing new
subclusters produces substantially different (i.e., distant) brain
activity patterns. The second metric we used, density of task
separation, indicates whether separating clusters into subclusters
maintains a balanced distribution of task groups across subclusters
(as opposed to producing disproportionately large/small subclus-
ters, such as a cluster consisting of only one task group).4 De-
creases in the density of task separation indicate good solutions
and reflect a split into subclusters with balanced numbers of task
groups. Taking our two clustering metrics together, an optimal
solution is indicated by a model order with a relatively high
difference in cophenetic distance and a relatively low density of
task separation.
To check the stability of our clustering, we repeated the proce-
dure with leave-one-out jackknife sensitivity analysis.5 Figure 3A
shows the range of clustering metrics found across our jackknife
repeats (n  5000), which was taken as a guide for selecting the
best clustering solutions. Furthermore, for the three-cluster solu-
tion (which we present as a main result later), we show the
consistency with which task groups were assigned to clusters
across iterations of our jackknife analysis (see bar plots in Figure
3B). In general, good consistency (agreement for more than 90%
of iterations) was found for most task groups (except for Rational
Actions).
3 The relative difference in cophenetic distances dc when transitioning from
one model order (x) to the next higher one (x  1) can be derived from the
cophenetic distances cx and cx  1 in the form of dc  (cx  1 – cx) / (cx  1).
4 If cluster i0 consisted of n0 task groups at model order x, and at model
order x  1 was separated into subclusters i1 and i2 with n1 and n2 task
groups, then the density of task separation can be calculated as ds  n1/n0,
with n1  n2.
5 That is, we removed one random study from each task group (simul-
taneously), calculated the meta-analyses with the remaining studies, clus-
tered the new results, replaced the removed studies, and repeated the
process. We carried out 5,000 clusterings based on leave-one-out samples
and summarized the metrics across all of them in Figure 3.
Figure 2. Results of separate meta-analyses for empathy task groups. Maps were thresholded at a voxel-wise
threshold of p  .005 uncorrected and a cluster extent threshold of 10 voxels. For Reasoning about Emotions,
we selected a common type of task that we found not only in the empathy literature but also in ToM studies. See























































































































297TOWARD A HIERARCHICAL MODEL OF SOCIAL COGNITION
Analysis of Overlap With Other Maps
For a broader perspective on our meta-analysis, we compared
our main results (see Figure 5) with an extensive set of automat-
ically generated meta-analyses across a wide range of topics. This
step allows us to discuss our findings in relation to brain activation
for a wide range of other social and also nonsocial processes. We
used the decoding tool of the neurosynth database (Yarkoni, Pol-
drack, Nichols, Van Essen, & Wager, 2011) for this analysis,
which we accessed via the larger neuroimaging repository neu-
rovault.org (Gorgolewski et al., 2015). In keeping with the recom-
mended input specifications, we created unthresholded versions of
mean and contrast maps for decoding.6 In Figures 6 and 7, we
showed the neurosynth decoding results as Pearson correlation
coefficients, describing image similarity between our maps and
automatically generated meta-analyses for research topics
(“terms”) identified by text mining of literature databases. For
clarity, we show only the most strongly correlated social and
nonsocial terms found with neurosynth decoding.7 In addition, we
discarded terms of little interest for the current article, such as for
example neuroanatomical labels (e.g., mpfc, psts).8
6 As result maps from meta-analytic contrasts originally contain positive
(e.g. map1  map2) and negative (e.g. map2  map1) values, we next
removed (masked) all negative values from these images to obtain clearly
interpretable decoding results. To illustrate, after masking, results for
decoding of the contrast (map1  map2) provides results that can be
specifically linked to activations in map 1.
7 A large number of correlated terms is found by neurosynth decoding.
For clarity, we decided to select a small number (five) of top-ranked
associations to highlight major themes linked to our results. Note that terms
found formed topically coherent clusters (see Figures 6 and 7—terms
cluster around the topics language, default mode network function, and
sensory–affective processing). Therefore, in our discussion, we interpreted
the relation of our maps to major themes identified by neurosynth rather
than individual terms.
8 We further discarded technical/unspecific terms (e.g. independent com-
ponent, task, state) and conceptually redundant terms (e.g. dmn and mode
are redundant with default) from our selection.
Figure 3. (A) Evaluation and comparison of different clustering solutions. The plot shows changes in two metrics
when moving from 2- to 3-, 3- to 4- . . . , and 10- to 11-cluster solutions. The first metric, shown in red (dark grey)
and on the left y axis, gives the relative difference in cophenetic distances when moving from one model to the next.
A relatively high difference in cophenetic distances indicates that introducing new subclusters results in a better
separation of brain activity patterns and thus good clustering. The second metric, shown in blue (light grey), shows
the density of task separation, reflecting whether separating clusters into subclusters maintains a balanced number of
task groups in each subcluster. The relatively low density of task separation indicates good clustering. Preferred
clusterings in terms of both metrics are indicated on the x axis: 3, 8, and 11. Metric changes are shown for the
clustering of complete meta-analyses (main analysis) and clusterings based on leave-one-out jackknife sensitivity
analysis with 5,000 repeats (jackknife mean, standard deviation [SD]). (B) Stability of the assignment of task groups
(i.e., associated meta-analytic maps) to clusters for the three-cluster solution, based on leave-one-out jackknife
sensitivity analysis. The bars indicate the percentage of jackknife repeats for which task groups were assigned to the























































































































298 SCHURZ ET AL.
To further characterize the neurocognitive processes linked to
our meta-analysis maps, we calculated the overlap of our meta-
analysis with a whole-brain map of brain connectivity organization
(Margulies et al., 2016) and a resting-state connectivity parcella-
tion atlas (Yeo et al., 2011). We determined overlaps with these
maps by conjunction analysis9 and summarized them as a variant
of the dice score: For each meta-analysis map, we calculated the
percentage of voxels it comprised that fell within different parts of
each connectivity map.10
Results and Discussion
In the next sections, we describe the task groups that we found
in the ToM and empathy literature and briefly review some of the
rationale behind each type of task. These task groups will then be
input for our key analysis, the meta-analytic clustering, which
follows in the Clustering section. Concrete task examples are given
in Table 1 for ToM and Table 2 for empathy task groups. We also
illustrate the meta-analytic result maps for each task group in
Figures 1 and 2.
Task Groups: ToM
False belief. False Belief tasks have been widely used in
developmental psychology and were quickly adapted for neuroim-
aging using the story format (e.g., Gallagher et al., 2000). These
False Belief stories had a particular logical structure. As illustrated
in Table 1, stories typically first introduce a person and his/her true
belief about a state of affairs. Unknown to that person, this state
changes thereafter. As a result, the person’s belief becomes false.
Participants are then asked a question related to that belief. To
account for this structure of False Belief stories, our meta-analysis
only included more recent studies presenting false photograph
control conditions of similar form (e.g., Dodell-Feder, Koster-
Hale, Bedny, & Saxe, 2011; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003), see Table
1 for examples. Note that for False Belief tasks, we found many
more eligible studies in the literature than for other task groups (38
studies in total). To avoid large differences in size between task
groups, we randomly selected 25 studies from this large sample of
False Belief tasks.
Trait judgments. Inspired by the discovery of brain areas
specialized for conceptual knowledge about different classes of
inanimate stimuli (e.g., tools, houses), Trait Judgment tasks were
introduced. These tasks, which aimed to find brain areas with a
9 For overlaps with resting-state networks, we used the seven-network
parcellation by Yeo et al. (2011), more specifically a MNI transformed
version (liberal mask, see https://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/fswiki/
CorticalParcellation; Yeo et al., 2011).
For the connectivity gradient, a partitioned version consisting of 20 maps
was used, each corresponding to a five-percentile step along its progres-
sion. All resting-state/gradient-percentile maps were in turn overlaid with
our meta-analysis result maps by determining conjunction images after
binarizing all inputs (in SPM12). Because all inputs conformed to the MNI
space, only adjustment of images in terms of size and resolution was
required (which we implemented via the reslice function in SPM12, with
the resting-state/gradient-percentile maps being the image-defining space).
10 That is, if i1 is a meta-analysis map and i2 a connectivity map, we
calculated n voxels in (i1&i2) / n voxels in i1.
Figure 4. (A) Degree of dissimilarity between meta-analytic result maps (given as 1-Pearson’s r). High
dissimilarity reflects little correspondence or overlap between brain maps. (B) Dendrogram from hierarchical
clustering. The height of the branches indicates cophenetic distances and thus the dissimilarity between
subclusters at that model order. Color bars indicate positions of the three- and eight-cluster solutions with respect























































































































299TOWARD A HIERARCHICAL MODEL OF SOCIAL COGNITION
Figure 5. Mean brain activation for clusters at different model orders. We carried out pooled meta-
analyses, that is, one separate meta-analysis per cluster, where all its task groups are joined together.
Analyses were thresholded at a voxel-wise threshold of p  .005 uncorrected and a cluster extent threshold
of 10 voxels. The one-cluster solution is shown for illustrative purposes only and was not evaluated or
compared against other clusterings. Colors indicate how the three-cluster solution relates to both higher-
and lower-level clusterings: blue– cognitive cluster (left column), green–intermediate cluster (middle
column), red–affective cluster (right column). At the lowest level of the dendrogram, we indicate for each
cluster some exemplary stimulus and task categorizations. The eight-cluster solution was selected as a
representative low-level clustering. However, note that the 11-cluster solution shows favorable clustering
metrics but corresponds to what has been shown in Figures 1 and 2 (i.e., complete separation into individual























































































































300 SCHURZ ET AL.
comparable level of specialization for conceptual knowledge about
persons (e.g., Mitchell, Heatherton, & Macrae, 2002), quickly
became widely used. Trait Judgment tasks in our meta-analysis
presented participants with written material concerning another
person’s traits (e.g., adjectives, opinions, or personal episodes).
Usually, the person was only described verbally to participants.
However, a few studies presented photographs of the person char-
acterized (e.g., faces, body parts, or the person as a whole). Control
conditions for Trait Judgments diverted attention away from these
mental states by asking for linguistic judgments on trait words
(e.g., “Is this word written in upper- or lowercase?”) or presented
words/statements that did not contain mental states.
Strategic games. Early studies used Strategic Games for
studying ToM based on the idea that feedback from a social
partner—indicated by their moves in the game—may trigger spon-
taneous mentalizing. Even when not explicitly asked to “mind-
read,” participants would spontaneously try to guess (i.e., infer) the
intentions of the other player (e.g., Rilling, Sanfey, Aronson,
Nystrom, & Cohen, 2004). This relates to the notion of an “inten-
tional stance” (e.g., Dennett, 1971), that is, a disposition to reason
about the beliefs, desires, and intentions of others (Gallagher, Jack,
Roepstorff, & Frith, 2002). Our meta-analysis included studies
where participants were asked to play a game with another player
with whom they could compete or cooperate (e.g., the prisoner’s
dilemma game). Players received feedback about the decision of
the other player, but they could not see each other. The contrast of
interest was typically brain activation for playing strategic games
with a human partner compared with playing with a computer
(which follows a simple algorithm).
Social animations. Social Animations were introduced (Cas-
telli, Frith, Happé, & Frith, 2002; Castelli, Happé, Frith, & Frith,
2000) as a low-level alternative to verbal or cartoon-based mate-
rials used in the field (e.g., Baron-Cohen et al., 1994; Fletcher et
al., 1995; Happé et al., 1996). The idea was to trigger ToM
processes with minimal input to distinguish central mechanisms
for mental-state attribution from other, potentially stimulus-
related, processes. Studies in this task group presented video
animations of simple geometrical shapes or objects which per-
formed movements resembling intentional or social interactions.
This type of stimulus is based on the classical-triangles task by
Figure 6. Mean brain activation from meta-analyses for the three-cluster solution (pooled meta-analyses), at a
voxel-wise threshold of p  .005 uncorrected and a cluster extent threshold of 10 voxels. The polar plots show
results from large-scale meta-analytic decoding (www.neurosynth.org; Yarkoni et al., 2011). Meta-analysis maps
were compared with an extensive set of automatically generated meta-analyses across a wide range of topics
(terms), and findings of highest convergence (image correlation, i.e., Pearson’s r) are shown. For each of our
three clusters, we show the five most strongly correlated terms found for social and nonsocial topics (for further
details, see the Analysis of Overlap With Other Maps section). The abbreviation “asd” (identfied by neurosynth























































































































301TOWARD A HIERARCHICAL MODEL OF SOCIAL COGNITION
Heider and Simmel (1944). In control conditions, the animations
showed random or purely mechanical movements (e.g., resembling
the movement of billiard balls on the table). For each movie,
participants were asked to explain/decide if an interaction between
two shapes took place. One study in this task group showed similar
movies in the experimental and control conditions but varied
instructions (e.g., by asking participants to focus on physical
properties in the control condition).
Reading the mind in the eyes. The Reading the Mind in the
Eyes Test was introduced in neuroimaging research based on its
capacity to dissociate social from more general abilities or intel-
ligence and was linked to ToM and mind-reading abilities in
earlier work (Baron-Cohen, Ring, et al., 1999). To illustrate, it was
found that adults with high-functioning autism spectrum disorder
(Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997), as well as
parents of children with autism spectrum disorder (Baron-Cohen &
Hammer, 1997), show deficits on this task but not children with
William’s syndrome (Tager-Flusberg, Boshart, & Baron-Cohen,
1998). Neuroimaging studies using the Reading the Mind in the
Eyes task presented a photograph of the eye region of a face and
asked participants to think about the person’s mental state or
indicate which adjective (among several options) best described
the person’s mental state. Control conditions showed similar pho-
tographs but asked for physical judgments of the persons depicted
(e.g., gender or age) or, in one exceptional case, simply asked for
passive viewing of a fixation cross. Note that for the sake of
sample coherence (and in light of the empathy tasks we compare
here), we did not include two studies from the Reading the Mind
in the Eyes sample in Schurz et al. (2014) because these studies
asked participants for more basic emotion judgments.
Rational actions. Early studies presenting cartoons were in-
troduced as a nonverbal alternative to story-based mentalizing
(see, e.g., Brunet, Sarfati, Hardy-Baylé, & Decety, 2000). This was
in part to circumvent difficulties in studying social cognition in
schizophrenia accompanied by speech disorganization (Brunet,
Sarfati, & Hardy-Baylé, 2003; Sarfati, Hardy-Baylé, Besche, &
Widlöcher, 1997). All tasks in the Rational Actions group pre-
sented short cartoons and asked participants to predict a likely
Figure 7. Meta-analytic contrasts for the three clusters tailored to find specific commonalities between the
intermediate and each of the other two clusters. Maps are shown at a voxel-wise threshold of p  .005
uncorrected and a cluster extent threshold of 10 voxels. Meta-analytic decoding (www.neurosynth.org;
Yarkoni et al., 2011) results are given in polar plots, expressed as image correlation, that is, Pearson’s r.
For each contrast, we show the five most strongly correlated terms found for social and nonsocial topics.
Because we did not find any specific commonalities between the cognitive and affective clusters (at the
























































































































302 SCHURZ ET AL.
Table 1
Examples of Studies in Theory of Mind Task Groups
Author Experimental condition Control condition
False belief (25 studies)
Oliver, Vieira, Neufeld, Dziobek, &
Mitchell, 2018
Read a short vignette involving a person with
a false belief. Predict the behavior of this
person based on her belief. Stimuli adapted
from Dodell-Feder, Koster-Hale, Bedny,
and Saxe (2011) (e.g., “The morning of
high school dance Sarah placed her high
heel shoes under her dress and then went
shopping. That afternoon, her sister
borrowed the shoes and later put them
under Sarah’s bed. Sarah gets ready
assuming her shoes are under the dress”
[Yes or No])
Read a short vignette involving a photograph/physical
representation of the past, and a description of how
things depicted have changed by now. Answer a
question about the outdated scene shown (e.g.,
“Old maps of the islands near Titan are displayed
in the Maritime Museum. Erosion has since taken
its toll, leaving only the three largest islands. Near
Titan today there are many islands.” [Yes or No])
Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003 Read a short vignette involving a person with
a false belief. Answer a question about her
belief (e.g., “John told Emily that he had a
Porsche. Actually, his car is a Ford. Emily
doesn’t know anything about cars so she
believed John. When Emily sees John’s
car, she thinks it is a . . . ?” [Porsche or
Ford])
Read a false-photograph vignette. Answer a question
concerning the outdated content in the photo (e.g.,
“A photograph was taken of an apple hanging on a
tree branch. The film took half an hour to develop.
In the meantime, a strong wind blew the apple to
the ground. The developed photograph shows the
apple on the . . . ?” [Tree or Ground])
Trait judgments (19 studies)
Ma et al., 2011 Read a written statements conveying trait
diagnostic information about persons
(describing behavior). Then read a single
trait-adjective and indicate whether it is
consistent with the behavior of that person
(e.g., “Tolvan gave her sister a hug . . .
consistent with [friendly]?”)
Read a written statement about a person doing
something. This behavior is neutral and does not
convey trait diagnostic information about the
person. Indicate the gender of the person in the
sentence (e.g., “Tolvan gave her mother a bottle
. . . is Tolvan male or female?”)
Zhu, Zhang, Fan, & Han, 2007 Read a personality trait adjective (e.g., brave,
childish) and indicate whether it correctly
describes a former American president
(Bill Clinton, Yes or No).
Read a personality trait adjective (e.g., brave,
childish) and indicate whether it is written in
lower- or uppercase (Yes or No).
Strategic games (13 studies)
Takahashi, Izuma, Matsumoto,
Matsumoto, & Omori, 2015
Play the matching-pennies game against a
human. Both players are asked to choose
one of two options at the same time. For
one player, the goal is to choose the same
options as the other. For the other player,
the goal is to choose a different option.
Play the matching-pennies game against a computer.
Both players are asked to choose one of two
options at the same time. For one player, the goal
is to choose the same options as the other. For the
other player, goal is to choose a different option.
Kircher et al., 2009 Play the prisoner’s dilemma game (iterated
version). You play with a human player
for game points. Both players choose a
cooperative or defective strategy on each
trial. If both players choose defective, they
gain almost no game points at all. If both
choose cooperative, both gain some game
points. If players choose differently, the
defective player gains more points.
Play the prisoner’s dilemma game (iterated version).
You play with a computer for game points.
Social animations (20 studies)
Moessnang et al., 2016 Watch a video animation of two interacting
triangles, which involve influence on each
other’s mental states (e.g., coaxing).
Indicate whether a social/goal-directed/
random movement was shown, and
indicate the feeling of both triangles
(Positive/Negative). Respond via button
press to both questions.
Watch a video animation of two triangles which
interact in a goal-directed manner (e.g., one
chasing the other). Indicate whether a social/goal-
directed/random movement was shown, and
indicate the feeling of both triangles
(Positive/Negative). Respond via button press to
both questions.
Castelli, Happé, Frith, & Frith, 2000 Watch video animation of two interacting
triangles (e.g., portraying a scene where
mother and child are playing). Explain
verbally what was happening (after fMRI).
Watch video animation of two randomly moving

























































































































303TOWARD A HIERARCHICAL MODEL OF SOCIAL COGNITION
ending based on the rational intentions of the protagonist (implied
in their current actions). To keep the task group conceptually
homogeneous and distinct from others, we did not include studies
which featured false-belief-related cartoons (e.g., deception), emo-
tional scenes, or centrally featured communicative acts (commu-
nicative intentions). In control conditions, questions about the
nonmental aspects of the scenes were asked, for example, physical
causality.
Task Groups: Empathy
Observing pain. Pain has been a central theme in empathy
research, as it was argued that it represents one of the most salient
forms of suffering in others (Ochsner et al., 2008; Zaki, Ochsner,
Hanelin, Wager, & Mackey, 2007). Empathizing with another’s
suffering is an essential feature of human social behavior, seen as
a critical precursor for more sophisticated forms of empathy and
central to moral reasoning (e.g., Morrison, Lloyd, Di Pellegrino, &
Roberts, 2004). Furthermore, because of its high saliency, pain is
an effective stimulus for engaging participants in a task and
measuring their brain activity. Studies in this task group presented
pictures or videos showing a person’s face or body parts in painful
situations. Tasks did not ask for an explicit judgment related to the
painful stimuli but rather for passive viewing or simple tasks
demonstrating attentional engagement (e.g., asking which trial
type was shown or to detect visual changes in a fixation cross
between trials). Whereas all experimental conditions presented
painful stimulations of body parts or faces, the control conditions
presented neutral physical stimulations (e.g., being touched by a
Q-tip) or no stimulation.
Observing emotions. Recognizing others’ emotional states
constitutes a process supporting empathy (e.g., Baron-Cohen,
2002; Schulte-Rüther, Markowitsch, Fink, & Piefke, 2007). How-
ever, an even stronger relationship between the observation of
(facial) emotions and empathy has been suggested. Based on
mirror neuron theories (e.g., Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004), it was
hypothesized that the (covert) mirroring of observed facial expres-
sions triggers activity in emotional brain areas and thus an empa-
thetic response (Carr, Iacoboni, Dubeau, Mazziotta, & Lenzi,
2003; Wicker et al., 2003). Researchers explored these relation-
ships in the context of simple passive viewing tasks presenting
facial expressions. Because the same task type has also been
widely used in other fields of neuroimaging research, we obtained
additional studies for this task group from a large sample of
suitable research (Fusar-Poli et al., 2009) to achieve n  25 as the
sample size.11 All studies in our task group presented pictures or
videos of faces displaying basic emotional expressions (e.g., anger,
fear, happiness, or disgust). Participants were not asked for explicit
emotion judgments but passively viewed the stimuli or made
judgments regarding nonemotional stimulus characteristics (e.g.,
gender or physical properties). In control conditions, faces showed
neutral expressions, or no stimuli were presented at all.
Sharing emotions or pain. Whereas the previous task groups
have been related to more automatically occurring processes, the
11 After identifying facial emotion viewing studies in the empathy lit-
erature, we added studies to this sample to achieve a task group of 25
studies. We randomly selected additional studies from a meta-analysis on
implicit (uninstructed) facial emotion recognition (Fusar-Poli et al., 2009).
Table 1 (continued)
Author Experimental condition Control condition
Reading the mind in the eyes (15 studies)
Baron-Cohen et al., 1999 View a photograph showing the eye region of
a face. Indicate which of two words (e.g.,
concerned versus unconcerned) describes
the mental state of that person (button
press).
View a photograph showing the eye region of a face.
Indicate whether the person is male or female
(button press).
Bos et al., 2016 View a photograph showing the eye region of
a face. Indicate if a mental state word
presented before (e.g., shy, hostile, playful)
matches the photo.
View a photograph showing the eye region of a face.
Indicate whether a nonmental state word presented
before (e.g., woman, curly hair, heavy eyebrows)
matches the photo.
Rational actions (11 studies)
Brunet, Sarfati, Hardy-Baylé, &
Decety, 2000
View a cartoon story and predict what will
happen based on the intentions of a
character (no false belief). Choose a
logical story ending from several options
shown in pictures (e.g., “A prisoner is in
his cell. First, he breaks the bars of his
prison window. Then he walks to his bed.”
Indicate what will happen next . . . “The
prisoner ties a rope from the sheets on his
bed/the prisoner shouts out loud to get
some attention.”)
View cartoon stories and predict what will happen
(press button) based on physical causality (e.g., “A
person is standing in front of a slide. A large ball
is coming down the slide, heading towards that
person.” Indicate what will happen next . . . “The
ball knocks over the person/the ball rests on the
ground and the person stands beside it.”)
Heleven, van Dun, & Van Overwalle,
2019
View cartoon stories showing a person over a
sequence of events. The order of pictures
(i.e., events) is jumbled. Indicate the
correct order of pictures based on the
intentions of the character (button press).
View cartoon stories showing a sequence of events.
The order of pictures (i.e., events) is jumbled.
Indicate the correct order of pictures based on
physical causality (button press).























































































































304 SCHURZ ET AL.
present task group probes more voluntary and explicit forms of
empathy (see, e.g., de Greck, Shi, et al., 2012; de Greck, Wang, et
al., 2012) that are possibly linked to top-down regulatory processes
(see van der Heiden, Scherpiet, Konicar, Birbaumer, & Veit,
2013). The task group contains comparable stimuli as the previous
categories (faces with basic emotions, body parts in painful situ-
ations), but here participants were explicitly instructed to share the
emotional state of the target (e.g., “feeling into” her). In some
instances, participants were additionally asked to rate the experi-
enced or expressed emotion. In control conditions, participants
made similar judgments but based on faces with neutral emotional
expressions or body parts under nonpainful stimulation.
Evaluating situated emotions. Another group of studies
added situational context to empathy tasks. Here, researchers ar-
gued that empathy involves more than just focusing on another
person but also considers how they are embedded in a situation and
contextual background (e.g., Regenbogen et al., 2012; Ruby &
Decety, 2004). Tasks presenting such contextual information were
Table 2
Examples of Studies in Empathy Task Groups
Author Experimental condition Control condition
Observing pain (21 studies)
Olsson, Nearing, & Phelps, 2007 Watch a video of a model undergoing fear-
conditioning situations (receiving a
shock). No response.
Watch a video of a model undergoing fear-conditioning
situations (not receiving a shock). No response.
Bos, Montoya, Hermans, Keysers,
& van Honk, 2015
Watch videos of hands under painful
(needle) stimulation. Watch attentively
and detect changes in the fixation cross
appearing between videos.
Watch videos of hands under nonpainful (cotton swab)
stimulation. Watch attentively and detect changes in
the fixation cross appearing between videos.
Observing emotions (25 studies)
Critchley et al., 2000 View a picture of a face with an emotional
expression (anger, fear). Judge the
gender of the person (button press).
View a picture of a face with a neutral expressions.
Judge the gender of the person (button press).
Toller et al., 2015 View a video of a face showing fearful
expression. Relax and focus on the
actor’s eyes.
View a video of landscapes. Relax and do nothing.
Sharing emotions or pain (12 studies)
Preis, Schmidt-Samoa, Dechent, &
Kroener-Herwig, 2013
View a picture of a body part (hand) under
painful stimulation. Imagine how the
person in the picture feels and rate their
pain (VAS).
View a picture of a body part (hand) under nonpainful
stimulation. Imagine how the person in the picture
feels and rate their pain (VAS).
Reniers, Völlm, Elliott, & Corcoran,
2014
View a picture of a face with a sad
expression. Imagine what the person in
the picture is feeling. No response in the
scanner.
View a picture of a face with a neutral expression.
Imagine what the person in the picture is feeling. No
response in the scanner.
Evaluating situated emotions (15
studies)
Kanske et al., 2015 Watch a video of a person telling about a
negative autobiographical event. Rate
how you feel and how much compassion
you feel with the person in the video
(button press).
Watch a video of a person telling about a neutral
autobiographical event. Rate how you feel and how
much compassion you feel with the person in the
video (button press).
Reyes-Aguilar et al., 2017 Read a short vignette about an emotionally
negative or positive event, then view a
picture of the person to whom it
happens. Think about what this person is
feeling (no overt response).
Read a short vignette about an emotionally neutral
event, then view a picture of the person to whom it
happens. Think about what this person is feeling (no
overt response).
Reasoning about emotions (12 studies)
Hooker, Verosky, Germine, Knight,
& D’Esposito, 2010
View a series of pictures with two persons.
One person realizes that he/she
mistakenly had a false belief regarding
an emotion-triggering state of affairs.
That leads to a change in his/her
emotions. Indicate whether the pictures
show a social (i.e., emotional) change, a
physical change, or no change (button
press).
View a series of pictures with two persons. One person
has a false belief regarding an emotion-triggering
state of affairs. Nothing changes over the next
pictures (so the person does not realize that he/she
had a false belief). Indicate whether the pictures
show a social (i.e., emotional) change, a physical
change, or no change (button press).
Völlm et al., 2006 View a cartoon story showing two persons.
One is in an emotion-triggering
situation. Predict what the other person
will do to make this person feel better
(button press).
View a cartoon story showing two persons in a neutral
everyday situation. Predict what will happen next
based on physical causality (button press).























































































































305TOWARD A HIERARCHICAL MODEL OF SOCIAL COGNITION
taken to measure a more naturalistic form of empathy (see Mathur,
Harada, Lipke, & Chiao, 2010; Zaki, Weber, Bolger, & Ochsner,
2009), different from previous task groups presenting (over)
simplified stimuli. Studies asked participants to judge a person’s
emotion based on the situation they were experiencing (e.g., by
selecting among alternatives). The situational context was either
verbally described by the target person or given as a written
narrative. The target person was additionally shown to participants
in all tasks, either in a picture or video (telling the story of how the
event happened). Control conditions either asked for similar judg-
ments in the context of emotionally neutral content or diverted
attention away from emotional material by asking for physical
judgments (e.g., judging whether the person was shown on the left
or right side of the screen).
Reasoning about emotions. The intersection between empa-
thy and ToM is a recurrent topic in research, bearing concepts such
as cognitive empathy (Hooker et al., 2010; Preston & de Waal,
2002; Schnell, Bluschke, Konradt, & Walter, 2011; Shamay-
Tsoory et al., 2009), affective ToM (Mier et al., 2010; Schlaffke et
al., 2015; Sebastian et al., 2012), mentalizing about emotion
(Hooker Verosky, Germine, Knight, & D’Esposito, 2008), and
emotional perspective taking (Derntl et al., 2010, 2012). Across
the diversity of labels, we identified several tasks with coherent
stimuli and instructions, which were characterized by combining
mental state reasoning with emotion judgments. The interrelation
between those elements could go in either direction. One set of
studies asked participants to infer a future rational action (and
therefore, rational intention) triggered by an emotion. Another set
of studies asked for inferences about an emotion or emotional
change triggered by beliefs or a belief revision (e.g., a person
becomes aware of an emotionally relevant object or event). The
typical stimulus format in this task group was pictures or cartoons
(but we accepted one additional task with a verbal story format).
Control conditions asked for inferences about future events based
on physical causality or other forms of less complex inference.
Although it can be strongly linked to both empathy and ToM
literature, we cover this task group in the section on empathy tasks.
This is because a (weak) majority of these studies were found by
empathy-related keywords. Note, however, that labeling this task
as an empathy (or ToM) task has no effect on our clustering, which
is purely driven by the features of our meta-analytic brain activa-
tion maps, irrespective of terminology.
Clustering
Based on the meta-analytic result maps obtained for all 11 task
groups, we carried out clustering. This is the central step of our
analysis, which allows us to estimate an appropriate number of
subcomponents of ToM and empathy. For an overview of corre-
spondences between task groups, we show the image dissimilarity
of the 11 meta-analyses in Figure 4A. In Figure 4B, we present a
dendrogram that illustrates task-by-task and cluster-by-cluster re-
lations. Based on the information shown in the dendrogram, we
selected an optimal clustering based on two features (see Figure
3A). First, our desired model ensures a good separation of brain
activation patterns between clusters. Second, the components of a
good model should be sufficiently abstract to generalize across
concrete instances, that is, multiple task groups, rather than picking
up variance related to one outlier task group.
Metrics show that among all clusterings, the three-cluster solu-
tion shows the best performance (see Figure 3A). This result is of
central relevance to our aim to find common neurocognitive com-
ponents across ToM and empathy tasks. We will argue throughout
the next sections and in our Conclusion section (A Hierarchical
Perspective) that the three-cluster solution reflects central pro-
cesses for social cognition.
Although we also observed that the simpler two-cluster solution
already explains part of the variation in brain activation, the
three-cluster solution explains substantial additional variance.12
Therefore, we will discuss both the two- and three-cluster solution
as high-level clustering solutions (i.e., those that divide the data
only in a small number of clusters). Across all clustering solutions,
we found clusterings with further explanatory values at model
orders 8 and 11, with the 11-cluster solution performing particu-
larly well. As we will explain in the next sections, the hierarchical
structure of our clustering allows us to adopt a multilevel perspec-
tive on our results, consistent with previous conceptualizations of
social cognition as a multilayered or multilevel phenomenon (De
Waal, 2012; Preston & De Waal, 2002; Schaafsma et al., 2015;
Singer, 2006). The Russian doll model, for instance, proposes that
the core functions of motor mimicry and emotional contagion are
embedded in several layers of more complex processes, ranging up
to perspective taking (De Waal, 2007; De Waal & Preston, 2017).
In the next sections, we will discuss the two-, three-, and 11-cluster
solution. Finally, we will integrate them by proposing a multilevel
model of social–cognitive processes in our Conclusion section (A
Hierarchical Perspective). Also note that the multilevel nature of
our results evades potential concerns regarding publication bias.
For example, a common form of publication bias is the tendency
to preferentially report results that correspond to well-established
standard findings in a field. Arguably, this may drive increased
coherence within empathy and ToM studies, respectively, and thus
inflate evidence for a two-cluster solution (empathy-vs.-ToM).
However, such a publication bias cannot account for our three- and
11-cluster solutions, because they cover results across empathy
and ToM fields.
High-Level Clusterings
Two-cluster solution. The two-cluster solution shows that
our approach could retrace large parts of the classical ToM versus
empathy distinction made in the literature (see, e.g., Bzdok et al.,
2012; Kanske, Böckler, & Singer, 2017; Preston & Hofelich, 2012;
Walter, 2012). The networks that we found for the two-cluster
solution (see Figure 5) broadly converged with typical ToM (e.g.,
Koster-Hale & Saxe, 2013; Mitchell, 2009; Molenberghs et al.,
2016; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Van Overwalle, 2009) and em-
pathy areas, respectively (e.g., Bzdok et al., 2012; Singer & Lamm,
2009; Timmers et al., 2018). Of six task groups retrieved from the
ToM literature, five ended up in a common cluster. On the other
12 Although the twofold clustering fell out of range for our metric
calculation, its explanatory power is shown in the dendrogram in Figure
4B. Because of the hierarchical nature of our clustering, good performance
for both the two- and three-cluster solution are compatible observations:
The three-cluster solution contains the division made in the two-cluster
solution (i.e. it does not lose this information). In addition, it adds another
division (by splitting the cluster containing mostly ToM tasks in two























































































































306 SCHURZ ET AL.
hand, three of five task groups from the empathy literature were
grouped together. Figure 5 illustrates how the remaining three task
groups end up at somewhat unexpected positions in higher levels
of the clustering.
The first group was the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task,
which researchers originally described as “an advanced test of
theory of mind” (e.g., Baron-Cohen, Ring, et al., 1999). This task
clustered together with other task groups drawn from the empathy
literature (see Figure 5). Brain activation in the left inferior frontal
gyrus, anterior insula, and anterior cingulate cortex (see also
Molenberghs et al., 2016) largely overlapped with areas found for
the other empathy tasks in the cluster. Despite asking participants
to select high-level mental-state-related words such as interested,
affectionate, or contented, it has been suggested that the Reading
the Mind in the Eyes test might engage processing of emotional
states and detection of subtle facial cues. Oakley, Brewer, Bird,
and Catmur (2016) found that Reading the Mind in the Eyes task
performance is more strongly related to individual differences in
alexithymia than in autism spectrum disorder, suggesting that it
measures emotion recognition ability in addition to, or even rather
than, ToM abilities. Furthermore, as we review in more detail in
the Behavioral Separability of Tasks From the Three-Cluster So-
lution section, task performance correlations in nonimpaired par-
ticipants link the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test to face-based
emotion categorization (Olderbak et al., 2015) but not to process-
ing of beliefs (e.g., Strange Stories task: Dziobek et al., 2006; Rice,
Anderson, Velnoskey, Thompson, & Redcay, 2016). In addition, a
link to more intermediate tasks combining cognitive and affective
elements has been reported (Ferguson & Austin, 2010; see the
Behavioral Separability of Tasks From the Three-Cluster Solution
section for further explanation).
The other task groups that clustered unexpectedly were Evalu-
ating Situated Emotions and Reasoning about Emotions. We will
discuss potential processes underlying these tasks later in the
Intermediate Cluster (Cluster 2) section. While Evaluating Situated
Emotions tasks have been labeled empathy tasks in previous
research, studies from the Reasoning about Emotions group have
been described more heterogeneously. Similar paradigms have
been linked to cognitive empathy (Hooker et al., 2010), affective
ToM (Schlaffke et al., 2015), or mentalizing about emotion
(Hooker et al., 2008). We assigned the task group to empathy as it
contained more studies with empathy- than ToM-related key-
words. However, such an a priori assignment is debatable. Note,
however, that our data-driven clustering would have assigned this
task group at the same position irrespective of our labeling as
empathy or Theory of Mind.
Three-cluster solution. The three-way clustering reflects a
central result of our analysis and will be discussed in depth
throughout the next sections. Finally, in the Conclusion section (A
Hierarchical Perspective), we propose that it reflects the higher,
central level of a hierarchical multilevel model of social–cognitive
processes. Figure 5 shows the activated networks for the three
clusters. For simplicity, we will refer to these clusters as cognitive
(1), affective (3), and intermediate (2). The task-by-task dissimi-
larity matrix in Figure 4A suggests that the cognitive and affective
clusters form opposite poles with largely distinct brain activity
profiles while the intermediate cluster bears similarities to both
poles. This observation is further supported by a weaker image
correlation between the (unthresholded) cognitive and affective
cluster maps (r  .46) compared with correlations between the
intermediate and other two maps (intermediate-cognitive r  .80,
intermediate-affective r  .76).
For the functional description of the three clusters, we applied
neurosynth functional decoding (Yarkoni et al., 2011), a tool that
allows a brain activation map to be compared with an extensive set
of automatically generated meta-analyses across a wide range of
topics (“terms”). Highest convergence with social and nonsocial
terms is shown in Figures 6 and 7. Based on this broad decoding,
we can discuss our findings in the context of not only classical
theories of social processes but also alternative theories that sug-
gest more general-purpose processes to underlie ToM (e.g., Buck-
ner & Carroll, 2007; Corbetta, Patel, & Shulman, 2008; Heyes,
2018; Heyes & Frith, 2014) and empathy (e.g., Barrett, Lindquist,
& Gendron, 2007; Lindquist, Satpute, & Gendron, 2015; Wager et
al., 2016; but see Lieberman, Burns, Torre,& Eisenberger, 2016;
Lieberman & Eisenberger, 2015).
Cognitive cluster (Cluster 1). Brain activation for the cogni-
tive cluster (see Figure 5) was mainly found in the cortical midline
and temporoparietal areas. Strongest activation was found in the
anterior cingulate cortex and medial prefrontal cortex. This acti-
vation cluster extended along the cortical midline to the precuneus
and parts of the midcingulate cortex. Bilateral temporoparietal
areas included the right posterior superior temporal gyrus, right
supramarginal gyrus, left posterior middle temporal gyrus, and
inferior parietal lobule. Additional areas were found in bilateral
anterior temporal cortices and a smaller subcortical cluster (cau-
date). Compared with a resting-state network atlas of the brain
(Yeo et al., 2011), activations for cluster 1 showed the most
prominent overlap with the default mode network (DMN). More
specifically, 56% of voxels in cluster 1 fell within the DMN,
followed by smaller overlaps with the frontoparietal network (9%)
and the ventral attention network (also known as the salience
network, 9%).
Neurosynth decoding (see Figure 6) for social terms found the
strongest associations with theory of mind, mentalizing, and related
terms, characterizing the cognitive cluster as most prototypical of
ToM. For nonsocial terms, the strongest associations were
found for default, self-referential, and autobiographical. These
later decoding results mirror neurocognitive accounts of under-
standing others that emphasize the role of the DMN (see Buck-
ner & Carroll, 2007; Bzdok et al., 2013; Mars, Neubert, et al.,
2012; Mars, Sallet, et al., 2012; Meyer, Davachi, Ochsner, &
Lieberman, 2019; Spreng, Mar, & Kim, 2009; Spreng et al.,
2010; Spunt, Meyer, & Lieberman, 2015).
It has been argued (e.g., Andrews-Hanna, Smallwood, et al.,
2014) that self-generated cognition decoupled from the physical
world is mediated by the DMN. This becomes relevant for ToM
because we do not have immediate perceptual access to others’
mental states (see Frith & Frith, 2003; Lieberman, 2007). For
example, the self-projection hypothesis (Buckner & Carroll, 2007)
states that the DMN uses past experiences in an adaptive fashion
to imagine perspectives and events beyond those that emerge from
the immediate environment. In line with that, overlapping parts of
the DMN have been found implicated in other- and self-related
mental state reasoning (e.g., Mitchell et al., 2005; Murray, Schaer,
& Debbané (2012)).
Related theories were formulated in the ToM field (independent























































































































307TOWARD A HIERARCHICAL MODEL OF SOCIAL COGNITION
the separation of beliefs from reality (Frith & Frith, 2003, 2012;
Gallagher & Frith, 2003), metarepresentation of mental states in
the form of propositional attitudes (Leslie et al., 2004), the pro-
cessing of covert (i.e., unobservable) mental states (Gobbini, Ko-
ralek, Bryan, Montgomery, & Haxby, 2007), or perspective dif-
ferences (Perner & Leekam, 2008; Perner & Roessler, 2012).
An interesting feature of the cognitive cluster is that it contained
a specific subset of tasks from the ToM literature: False Belief
tasks, Trait Judgments, and Strategic Games. Whereas general-
purpose DMN theories usually make no predictions regarding the
type of ToM task that should engage this network, theories from
the ToM field usually associate False Belief tasks with decoupling
(e.g., Frith & Frith, 2003) and processing of covert mental states
(Gobbini et al., 2007). Relatedly, Strategic Games require tracking
potential deception (and thus beliefs) and therefore can also be
linked to decoupling.
Less frequently mentioned by DMN/decoupling theories is the
processing of personality traits (i.e., Trait Judgments). Arguably,
personality traits could be seen as mental states that are abstracted
(i.e., generalized) across concrete instances and are sometimes also
decoupled from observable behavior (e.g., a person might perform
the same dangerous action either out of courage or recklessness).
Moreover, it was hypothesized that the transient (e.g., beliefs) and
stable (e.g., traits) mental states of others are jointly processed by
a multilevel representation (Tamir & Thornton, 2018) where
knowledge about a person’s traits is used to guide expectations
about transient mental states (Conway, Catmur, & Bird, 2019;
Tamir & Thornton, 2018; see also Thornton, Weaverdyck, &
Tamir, 2019). To illustrate, a particularly distrustful person might
be harder to deceive and therefore less likely to have a false belief
(Conway et al., 2019).
Affective cluster (Cluster 3). For the affective cluster, we
found brain activation (see red in Figure 5) across the right frontal
cortex, peaking in the inferior frontal gyrus, and extending to the
right insula and temporal pole, pre- and postcentral gyri, as well as
the supramarginal gyrus. Further areas were activated in the left
inferior frontal gyrus, insula, temporal areas, and supramarginal
gyrus. Another large area was activated in the supplementary
motor area and the adjacent medial frontal gyrus and midcingulate
cortex. Two smaller areas were also found in the left inferior
occipital gyrus and left cerebellum. Overlaps with resting-state
networks (Yeo et al., 2011) for cluster 3 were mainly found in the
ventral attention network (26%), the somatosensory network
(16%), and the DMN (14%). The most prominent social terms
found with neurosynth decoding were pain, fear, affective, and
face (as well as the clinical term asd – autism spectrum disorder).
For nonsocial terms, we found high loadings on several language-
related terms, such as word, phonological, language, or semantic
(for a discussion of the possible roles of language processes, see
the Possible Roles of Language Processes in the Three-Cluster
Solution section). In line with the terms pain and fear found by
neurosynth decoding, strong activation for the affective cluster was
found in the left insula. This structure has been described as part
of a core network that activates whenever we witness the suffering
of others (e.g., Bzdok et al., 2012; Lamm et al., 2011; Preckel,
Kanske, & Singer, 2018). To illustrate, studies on empathy for pain
and other negative emotions consistently found activation in the
anterior insula and anterior cingulate cortex (Jabbi, Swart, &
Keysers, 2007; Jackson, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2005; Kanske, Böck-
ler, Trautwein, & Singer, 2015; Singer et al., 2004; Tholen, Trau-
twein, Böckler, Singer, & Kankse, 2020). Activation patterns in
these areas were found to predict the affective and emotional states
of an observed other. Such a relationship could be found across
different modalities such as pain, disgust, or unfairness (Corradi-
Dell’Acqua, Tusche, Vuilleumier, & Singer, 2016; but see Krish-
nan et al., 2016), which suggests that parts of these brain areas
encode affective rather than sensory features of stimuli. Moreover,
the same areas were found to be active not only during emotion
observation but also when participants themselves experienced an
emotion first-hand (e.g., Lamm et al., 2011; Rütgen et al., 2015).
This has been taken as evidence for shared networks in empathy
(Carrillo et al., 2019; Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2016; Gallese &
Goldman, 1998; Preston & de Waal, 2002; see also Alcalá-López,
Vogeley, Binkofski, & Bzdok, 2019). In addition to the left insula,
the affective cluster showed activation in the left inferior frontal/
precentral gyrus and postcentral (somatosensory) and supramar-
ginal gyri, which again have been linked to shared networks. In
particular, the premotor cortex has been linked to the mirroring of
emotional expressions, that is, the covert (or overt) imitation of
observed emotional facial expressions (cf. Adolphs, 2009; Carr et
al., 2003; Decety & Jackson, 2004; Gazzola, Aziz-Zadeh, & Key-
sers, 2006; Pfeifer & Dapretto, 2009; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009).
The shared-networks hypothesis was embedded in the general
framework of mirror neurons (Gallese, 2003; Gallese & Goldman,
1998; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004) and is compatible with theo-
ries of common coding for action and perception (Keysers &
Gazzola, 2009; Keysers, Kaas, & Gazzola, 2010) and perception-
action models (e.g., de Waal & Preston, 2017; Preston, 2007;
Preston & de Waal, 2002; Preston & Hofelich, 2012). These
models assume that seeing an emotional expression automatically
activates the corresponding motor- and somatosensory representa-
tions in the observer (producing an embodied representation),
which facilitates the decoding/understanding of these emotional
states. Such an interpretation is also supported by our neurosynth
decoding results, identifying the terms action and motor for the
affective cluster.
Tasks in the affective cluster broadly align with the notion of an
empathy core network for witnessing the pain or emotions of
others. The cluster contained those three task groups from the
empathy literature which present relatively simple stimuli concern-
ing others’ pain and emotions without any context or additional
information (Observing Pain, Observing Emotions, Sharing Emo-
tions or Pain). In addition, it included the Reading the Mind in the
Eyes task from the ToM literature, which also fits this description.
Interestingly, shared network (e.g., Preston & de Waal, 2002) and
mirroring (e.g., Gallese & Goldman, 1998) accounts often contain
the notion that the implicated processes are taking place sponta-
neously (or automatically), that is, in the absence of explicit task
instructions (see also Cracco et al., 2018; Heyes, 2011). Our results
show that for half of the task groups in the affective cluster,
participants were not explicitly instructed to empathize with oth-
ers. This suggests that at least part of the processes linked to affect
sharing do not need to be volitionally initiated, in keeping with the
aforementioned accounts.
Intermediate cluster (Cluster 2). Whereas the cognitive and
affective clusters reflect two largely independent processes, the
intermediate cluster takes an interesting position between them. In























































































































308 SCHURZ ET AL.
elements in terms of activated brain areas and included task
groups. We found brain activation for the intermediate cluster in
large parts of the bilateral temporal lobes, spanning from the
posterior superior temporal gyri to the anterior temporal lobes. We
observed activation in areas overlapping with parts of the cognitive
cluster (cluster 1), including the bilateral temporoparietal cortex
and precuneus. Furthermore, we also found some convergence
among activations found for the affective cluster, such as in the left
insula and inferior frontal gyrus. In terms of overlaps with resting-
state networks (Yeo et al., 2011), activations for cluster 2 fell in the
DMN (43%), the Ventral Attention Network (18%), and the Fron-
toparietal Network (10%). To further investigate activation for this
cluster, we carried out a set of meta-analytic contrasts tailored to
identify commonalities between the intermediate cluster and the
other two clusters.13 Analyses confirmed significant activation
specific for the cognitive and intermediate clusters in the precu-
neus, dorsal-posterior medial prefrontal cortex, bilateral temporo-
parietal, and anterior temporal areas (see Figure 7). Overall, these
activations were more pronounced in the right hemispheric areas.
For the intermediate and affective clusters, the strongest common
activations were found in the left insula and furthermore in the
bilateral inferior frontal gyri, left precentral gyrus, left superior
temporal gyrus, and supplementary motor area. Decoding of the
intermediate cluster showed largely a combination of terms al-
ready found for the cognitive and affective clusters. Notably,
however, some language-related terms showed higher loadings on
the intermediate cluster compared with both other clusters: sen-
tences, speech, listening, and comprehension. When decoding ac-
tivations common to the intermediate and cognitive clusters (see
Figure 7), we found social terms such as theory of mind, mental-
izing, and mental states and nonsocial terms such as default,
self-referential, and autobiographical. Decoding commonalities
between the intermediate and the affective cluster, we found social
terms such as touch, painful, face, and imitation (as well as the
clinical term asd), and nonsocial terms such as phonological,
reading, word, and language.
Together, meta-analytic contrast maps and decoding results (see
Figure 7) highlight that the intermediate cluster combines cognitive
and affective processes. Although theories proposed several variants
of this combination, the fact that we found one intermediate cluster
also suggests a common process. This common process could account
for the concepts affective ToM (Mier et al., 2010; Schlaffke et al.,
2015; Sebastian et al., 2012), cognitive empathy (Hooker et al., 2010;
Preston et al., 2007; Preston & de Waal, 2002; Schnell et al., 2011;
Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009; Walter, 2012), and emotional perspective
taking (Derntl et al., 2010, 2012).
The notion that the intermediate cluster combines cognitive and
affective processes is also supported by its anatomical position in
terms of macroscale connectivity architecture (see Figure 8). Further-
more, it is reflected by the combination of different features in this
cluster’s tasks. With respect to cognitive processes, the task groups
Reasoning about Emotions, Social Animations, and Rational Actions
all involve mental-state reasoning (i.e., about goals, intentions, or
beliefs) by definition. Also, the event narratives presented in the
Evaluating Situated Emotions task group provide rich information for
inferring not only the feelings of a person but also their thoughts and
desires. In line with this notion, Zaki et al. (2009) found that accurate
empathetic judgments based on event narratives are accompanied by
the corecruitment of more affective areas (premotor cortex, inferior
parietal lobule) and more cognitive areas that have been linked to
mentalizing (e.g., medial prefrontal cortex, superior temporal sulcus).
Besides cognitive features, most tasks from the intermediate cluster
also call for affective processing. Although the Evaluating Situated
Emotions and Reasoning about Emotions tasks do so by definition,
there is evidence that Social Animations trigger affective processes as
well. Tasks from this group mostly depict affective scenarios (e.g.,
mocking, tricking, coaxing) and have been reported to elicit subjective
emotional responses (Rimé, Boulanger, Laubin, Richir, & Stroobants,
1985). The involvement of affective processes is less clear for Ratio-
nal Actions, which did not include explicitly affective stimuli. Possi-
bly in relation to this, our clustering stability analysis (Figure 3B)
found that this task group frequently changed membership in favor of
the cognitive cluster. Taken together, our task groups suggest that the
degree to which affect-laden contents and mental-state inference
occur together determines whether cognitive and affective networks
work in concert.
Possible Roles of Language Processes in the
Three-Cluster Solution
A notable finding from neurosynth decoding was that both the
intermediate and affective clusters showed high loadings on language-
related terms. Possible contributions of language processes were dis-
cussed both in the empathy and ToM literature. In the empathy field,
at least two alternative views have been proposed on the topic. Based
on mirroring accounts, a first line of theorizing followed the obser-
vation that areas with mirror properties (e.g., Broca’s area, BA 44/45)
overlap with areas traditionally linked to speech production in humans
(e.g., Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). It was hypothesized that this
overlap might reflect that human language, including phonology and
syntax, is embedded in the organizational properties of the motor
system. Accordingly, the motor system represents an evolutionary
precursor of language functions (e.g., Gallese, 2008; but see Toni, De
Lange, Noordzij, & Hagoort, 2008). Our decoding might therefore not
necessarily reflect language processing per se but rather motor/mirror
processes taking place in the same regions. A second line of theoriz-
ing suggests a more direct role of language in emotion processing and
categorization. It has been repeatedly found that brain networks for
emotion processing overlap with large parts of networks for semantic
cognition (Binder, Desai, Graves, & Conant, 2009; Lindquist, Wager,
Kober, Bliss-Moreau, & Barrett, 2012; see also Brooks et al., 2017).
Thus, psychological constructionist accounts have suggested that con-
cepts available as words (e.g., anger, disgust, fear) shape how people
understand their experiences as specific emotions (e.g., Barrett et al.,
2007; Lindquist et al., 2015, 2017; Wilson-Mendenhall, Barrett, Sim-
mons, & Barsalou, 2011). Emotions have been taken to arise from a
combination of conceptual processing supported by language and
more basic experiences of affect such as the feeling of pleasure or
displeasure. Furthermore, the role of semantic knowledge has been
discussed in ToM related accounts, and previous meta-analyses (e.g.,
13 To find specific commonalities in the intermediate and cognitive
clusters (i.e. that go beyond what is also found for the affective cluster), we
computed the conjunction of contrasts cognitive  affective & intermedi-
ate  affective. Likewise, for specific commonalities between the inter-
mediate and affective clusters, we computed intermediate  cognitive &
affective  cognitive. For completeness, we also computed the contrast
























































































































309TOWARD A HIERARCHICAL MODEL OF SOCIAL COGNITION
Andrews-Hanna, Smallwood, et al., 2014; Mar, 2011) showed wide-
spread overlap between default mode and language-related processes.
For example, it was hypothesized that ToM involves mental-state
concepts that we learn (as children) by communicating with expert
mind readers (e.g., Heyes & Frith, 2014). Moreover, some forms of
mentalizing have been linked to the retrieval of social semantic scripts
(e.g., Frith & Frith, 2003; Gallagher & Frith, 2003), which contain
knowledge about which activities take place in different contexts.
Taken together, these theories suggest that both ToM- and empathy-
related processing involves language capabilities. Interestingly, while
decoding showed weaker loadings for the cognitive cluster (contain-
ing some classical verbal ToM tasks) on language-related terms (e.g.,
“sentences”, “language”), stronger relations were found for the affec-
tive and intermediate clusters.
Behavioral Separability of Tasks From the
Three-Cluster Solution
Exploring the broader implications of the three-cluster model,
we next evaluated whether our neural task clustering is mirrored
by a behavioral task clustering. Therefore, we reviewed behavioral
literature on healthy adults (i.e., different studies than those in our
meta-analysis14) for reports of performance correlations among
social cognition tasks. If the three clusters we found on the neural
14 We reviewed independent literature to find behavioral correlations.
All studies we report here are different from the neuroimaging studies in
our meta-analysis except Kanske et al. (2015). Because of its large sample
size and thus robust results, we also discuss the behavioral data of this
neuroimaging study.
Figure 8. (A) Whole-brain map of connectivity organization, capturing continuous changes (i.e., a principal
gradient) of brain connectivity patterns across the cortex. Gradient ranges from sensory and unimodal areas in
the sensorimotor, auditory, and visual cortex (green-blue/dark grey), to increasingly abstract and transmodal
areas (red-yellow/light grey) which largely correspond to the brain’s default mode network. This gradient was
determined by analyzing resting-state connectivity data from a large sample of healthy adults (Human Connec-
tome Project, n  820). (B) Percentiles along the gradient were split into 20 distinct maps. For each map, we
calculated the overlap with our meta-analyses. The bar charts provide the percent overlap between percentile
maps and meta-analyses, that is, what percent of voxels in a meta-analysis map overlapped with each percentile
























































































































310 SCHURZ ET AL.
level reflect different neurocognitive processes of social cognition,
then behavioral studies presenting tasks similar to those in our
neuroimaging meta-analysis should find a corresponding pattern of
task-by-task intercorrelations. In particular, we followed up two
observations from our neural clustering. First, the cognitive and
affective clusters showed largely distinct neural networks. There-
fore, behavior linked to tasks from cognitive versus affective
clusters may be uncorrelated (or weakly correlated). Second, the
intermediate cluster showed neural overlap with both the cognitive
and the affective clusters. We therefore expect that tasks linked to
this cluster show more widespread behavioral intercorrelations.
Specifically, studies should report intercorrelations both between
tasks from the cognitive and intermediate clusters, as well as the
affective and intermediate clusters.
With respect to the first prediction, behavioral studies clearly sup-
port the independence between processes associated with the cogni-
tive and affective clusters. Kanske, Böckler, Trautwein, Parianen-
Lesemann, and Singer (2016) tested both belief reasoning (cognitive
cluster) and evaluation of emotions (affective cluster) in a large
sample of nonimpaired adults using a combined-task setup (the Em-
paToM task). The authors found that behavioral performance in these
two measures was uncorrelated. Also, when additional data-driven
composites of several ToM and empathy tasks were used, no associ-
ation was found. Similarly, no correlation was found between perfor-
mance in the Reading the Mind in the Eyes (affective) and Strange
Stories (cognitive, because strange stories present various belief-
related contents, see, e.g., Happé, 1994; White, Hill, Happe, & Frith,
2009) tasks. This observation was made both for 7- to 12-year-old
children (Rice et al., 2016) and for adults (Dziobek et al., 2006). In
addition, double dissociations in cognitive versus affective task per-
formance have been found for patients with lesions in different brain
areas (e.g., Shamay-Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz, 2007; Shamay-Tsoory
et al., 2009).
With respect to our second, and maybe less obvious, prediction,
several studies report relevant results. Regarding associations be-
tween tasks from the affective and intermediate clusters, Lock-
wood, Bird, Bridge, and Viding (2013) found a positive correlation
between accuracy for ratings of social animations (in our interme-
diate cluster) and judgments of one’s affective reaction to emo-
tional faces (affective cluster). Interestingly, correlations were also
found between biological motion perception (affective/intermediate
cluster) and the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task (affective) both in
adults (Miller & Saygin, 2013) and 7- to 12-year-old children (Rice et
al., 2016).15 Biological motion perception can be linked to the affec-
tive cluster because of its relation to action perception (and thus
perception-action cycles for affect sharing; see, e.g., de Waal &
Preston, 2017; Keysers et al., 2010). However, stimuli are also related
to a task falling in the intermediate cluster (Social Animations), and as
we illustrate in Figure 9, brain activation for biological motion over-
laps most prominently with that for our intermediate cluster.
Another behavioral task that we tentatively link to the interme-
diate cluster is the Faux Pas test (e.g., Baron-Cohen, O’Riordan,
Jones, Stone, & Plaisted, 1999). Understanding a faux pas (e.g.,
observing someone who is hurting another person’s feelings out of
ignorance) requires the processing of not only belief-like states
(e.g., someone’s ignorance) but also their affective consequences
(e.g., subsequent regret/embarrassment due to accidentally hurting
someone’s feelings). Correspondingly, Ferguson and Austin
(2010) found an association in performance between the Faux Pas
test (intermediate) and the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task
(affective) in a large sample of nonimpaired adults.
With respect to correlations between tasks from cognitive and
intermediate clusters, results are more mixed. In a sample of
nonimpaired adults, Brewer, Young, and Barnett (2017) found no
correlation between behavioral performance on social animations
(intermediate cluster) and the Strange Stories task (cognitive clus-
ter). The authors noted, however, that this could be linked to range
restrictions in scores (as nonimpaired adults often show ceiling
effects on ToM tests linked to our cognitive cluster). Interestingly,
when rerunning the correlation analysis for a pooled sample of
nonimpaired adults and adults with autism spectrum disorder,
Brewer et al. (2017) found an association between performance on
Social Animations and Strange Stories. Similarly, for 7- to 12-
year-old children (Rice et al., 2016), a correlation between behav-
ioral performance in biological motion perception (affective/inter-
mediate) and Strange Stories (cognitive) was found.
Positioning the Three Clusters Along a Principal
Gradient of Macroscale Cortical Organization
To further characterize functional relations between the inter-
mediate and the cognitive and affective clusters, we projected our
clusters’ activation maps along a principal gradient of macroscale
cortical organization, which describes a functional spectrum along
the cortical surface based on functional connectivity patterns (Mar-
gulies et al., 2016). The gradient characterizes continuous changes
in these patterns, which reflect changes in functional roles: in-
creased distance (in terms of connectivity) from primary sensory
and motor areas reflects increasingly abstract and multimodal
processing (Margulies et al., 2016). As shown in Figure 8A,
unimodal sensory and motor representations lie at one end while
abstract multimodal representations lie at the other end of the
connectivity gradient. Grounding this map also in brain structure,
Margulies et al. (2016) showed that each region’s position on the
connectivity gradient strongly predicts the area’s spatial (i.e., geo-
desic) distance along the cortical surface to higher-order associa-
tion areas (at the top of the gradient).
We reasoned that if the intermediate cluster represents the parallel
involvement of cognitive and affective processes, its position along
the gradient should coextend with the positions of both other clusters.
Conversely, if the intermediate cluster represents a unique and largely
independent functional process, its position along the gradient should
be distinct. As shown in Figure 8B, the intermediate cluster tended to
overlap with the locations of both the cognitive and affective clusters
rather than any other positions. The cognitive cluster was located
close to the transmodal end of the gradient (85th–95th percentiles),
supporting its functional interpretation in terms of abstract, stimulus-
independent thought. The affective cluster was located toward the
middle of the gradient (35th–55th percentiles), which indicates more
sensory-based and unimodal processing.
These findings support our interpretation that the intermediate
cluster combines cognitive and affective processes, which is notable
15 Also note that our assignment of the Reading the Mind in the Eyes
task to the affective cluster is reflected by behavioral findings. For exam-
ple, Olderbak et al. (2015) reported a positive correlation between the
























































































































311TOWARD A HIERARCHICAL MODEL OF SOCIAL COGNITION
for several reasons. During passive rest, spontaneous fluctuations of
brain activity in corresponding areas and networks (e.g., affective:
Ventral Attention Network; cognitive: DMN) have been found to be
unrelated (e.g., Alcalá-López et al., 2018) and sometimes even anti-
correlated (Bzdok et al., 2013; Chai, Castañón, Öngür, & Whitfield-
Gabrieli, 2012; Fox et al., 2005; Zhou et al., 2018). During tasks
requiring externally focused attention, an inhibitory relation was
found between the ventral attention network and the DMN, which is
considered to reflect the former down-regulating the latter to reduce
interference from task-unrelated processes (Goulden et al., 2014;
Trautwein, Singer, & Kanske, 2016; Wen, Liu, Yao, & Ding, 2013;
see also Anticevic et al., 2012). Although these findings suggest that
areas linked to the cognitive and affective clusters are functionally
segregated in many task contexts, our meta-analysis identified a
cluster of tasks (intermediate) where cognitive and affective processes
operate conjointly.
Low-Level Clustering
As we take a multilevel perspective on our results, we also
consider clusterings beyond our central, high-level, three-cluster
solution. We will focus on the relation between high- and low-
level clusterings again in our Conclusion section (A Hierarchical
Perspective). Across the entire spectrum of solutions, our metrics
also pointed to two more low-level solutions, with 8 and 11
clusters. This suggests that brain activation contains additional
Figure 9. Overlaps between our three-cluster solution and meta-analyses on related topics of social cognition. For
each topic map, we indicate the percentage of voxels falling into each of the three meta-analytic clusters. Note that
percentage values are relative to the size of each topic-related map (e.g., maps containing extensive areas of activation
may feature more regions outside our three clusters). Therefore, the relative patterns of overlaps within each topic map
are of main interest. See the Relation to Other Meta-Analyses on Social Cognition section for more details. Footnotes:
1 For exploratory purposes, we show an uncorrected map of the meta-analysis results by Darda and Ramsey (2019).
2 Map from Boccadoro et al. (2019) shows results from a multistudy analysis on spontaneous ToM (not a
meta-analysis, based on original data), three studies, n  68. 3 Map from Cheong et al. (2017) shows the most
consistent overlaps across five published studies, summarized based on expanding reported coordinates into 15-mm-























































































































312 SCHURZ ET AL.
variability that goes beyond what is captured at our central high
level (three clusters). In particular, the 11-cluster solution showed
good performance, implying that task-to-task variability is large
enough that each gets assigned to a cluster of its own by the
algorithm. One possible explanation for this additional heteroge-
neity includes differences in stimuli and task instructions, which
might be unrelated to central processes linked to empathy and
ToM. We illustrate the role of stimuli and task instructions in our
additional color coding in Figure 5. For the sake of brevity, we
only map out two popular distinctions: verbal versus nonverbal
stimuli and instructed versus uninstructed tasks.16 Note that sev-
eral other (and partially related) categorizations have been dis-
cussed elsewhere but go beyond the scope of our exemplary
illustration (see, e.g., Fan et al., 2011; Mar, 2011; Molenberghs et
al., 2016; Timmers et al., 2018; Van Overwalle, 2009). Consistent
with the idea of finding more abstract classes of functioning at
higher levels, none of the clusters at model order 3 contains tasks
from only one category (e.g., only verbal tasks).17 At lower levels,
parts of subclusterings are accompanied by separations in terms of
task or stimulus formats. For example, the three task groups False
Belief, Trait Judgments, and Strategic Games cluster together at a
higher level (three-cluster solution), but Strategic Games are sep-
arated at a lower level (eight-cluster solution). These tasks differ in
that two of the former are verbal (sentences or words) whereas the
latter is nonverbal (strategic decision-making). Although this pat-
tern demonstrates that stimulus format is implicated in parts of
lower-level cluster separations, other observations demonstrate
that this does not provide a perfect explanation. For example, as
also illustrated in Figure 5, the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task
falls into the same categories as Trait Judgment tasks: verbal and
instructed. In addition, both tasks are drawn from the ToM liter-
ature. Nevertheless, the two tasks end up at opposite positions in
the clustering (see Figure 4B), and their activation maps show
relatively low similarity (see Figure 4A). Therefore, we conclude
that although stimulus and task format drives part of the variability
in meta-analytic activations, it does not provide a complete ac-
count of them. As we will argue in detail in our Conclusion section
(A Hierarchical Perspective), this pattern supports a multilevel
model for social-cognitive processes, similar to what has been
suggested in other fields such as intelligence and personality
research. The three-cluster solution (higher level) may reflect more
abstract and broad classes of functioning. The eight- and 11-cluster
solutions (lower level) capture additional variability, which possi-
bly describes how central processes are applied in concrete con-
texts of particular tasks. For such task contexts, both the stimulus
format and the task instructions play important roles.
Relation to Other Meta-Analyses on Social Cognition
The present meta-analysis and review focused on processes
involved in inferring others’ unobservable mental states and thus
on the literature on empathy and ToM. For the sake of coherence
and practical limitations, we did not carry out meta-analyses for
other topics in social cognition. For example, we did not cover
related processes such as action observation (“mirroring”). Fur-
thermore, we did not include tasks which involved mental state
inference as a subcomponent employed alongside other diverse
processes. This was the case, for example, for the topics of moral
cognition, social exclusion, or social decision-making. However,
we illustrate recently published meta-analyses on these topics
below and characterize the overlap with our meta-analytic clusters.
Figure 9 shows overlaps between thresholded maps from our
three-cluster solution and maps from other meta-analyses on social
topics. For a meta-analysis on biological motion perception focus-
ing on whole-body movement such as walking or dancing (Gros-
bras, Beaton, & Eickhoff 2012), we found the highest overlap with
the intermediate cluster. Moreover, the map also showed overlaps
with both the cognitive and affective clusters. However, note that
the intermediate cluster spatially overlaps with both other clusters
(see top row in Figure 9). For a meta-analysis on action observa-
tion or mirroring (Hardwick, Caspers, Eickhoff, & Swinnen,
2018), we illustrate overlaps specifically for meta-analysis on (a)
all types of action observation, (b) observation of actions per-
formed with arms, and (c) observation of actions performed with
faces. For all three maps, we found the largest overlap with the
affective cluster and, to a lesser extent, also with the intermediate
cluster. For a meta-analysis on inhibition of imitation (Darda &
Ramsey, 2019; see also Brass, Ruby, & Spengler, 2009; Hogeveen
et al., 2015), we again found preferential overlaps for the affective
and intermediate clusters.
Next, we overlaid our three-cluster solution to maps from re-
lated meta-analyses on more affective topics. For a meta-analysis
on emotion matching (Dricu & Frühholz, 2020), that is, matching
expressions of a target face and several other faces, overlap was
clearly highest with our affective cluster. For an additional meta-
analysis on emotion labeling (Dricu & Frühholz, 2020), we found
considerable overlaps with both the affective and intermediate
clusters. In this meta-analysis, tasks required participants to match
facial, vocal, or bodily expressed emotions with one label out of
several alternatives. For a meta-analysis on vicarious reward pro-
cessing (Morelli, Sacchet, & Zaki, 2015; see also Apps, Rush-
worth, & Chang, 2016; Lockwood, Apps, Roiser, & Viding, 2015),
we found limited overlaps of equal size for the cognitive and
affective clusters. In this group of tasks, participants would, for
example, witness how another person wins money, gets praised by
another person, or receives a pleasant touch.
We further included a meta-analysis on Social Exclusion tasks
(Vijayakumar, Cheng, & Pfeifer, 2017) in our overlap analysis.
Here, participants experienced being rejected mostly in the context
of a virtual ballgame (Cyberball), and some additional social
judgment/chatroom contexts. Overlaps for this meta-analysis were
mainly found with our cognitive cluster and, to a lesser extent, also
with our affective cluster. For a multistudy analysis (n  68) on
Spontaneous ToM (Boccadoro et al., 2019), we found equal de-
grees of overlap with our three clusters, and thus, no preference for
affective, intermediate, or cognitive clusters became clear. Tasks
16 We define verbal stimuli as items of written or spoken language that
contain task-relevant information and go beyond trivial task cues (e.g. recur-
ring instruction cues or response category reminders). The category instructed
tasks contains all tasks that explicitly instruct participants to infer, judge, or
think about the mental states (cognitive or affective) of others.
17 Figure 5 shows that at model order 3, the cognitive cluster contains
only one nonverbal task, which may give rise to the impression that it
features more verbal tasks than the other two. Note, however, that our
jackknife clustering analysis found that the nonverbal task group Rational
Actions frequently changes membership between the cognitive and inter-
mediate clusters, which weakens the coherence of a predominantly verbal























































































































313TOWARD A HIERARCHICAL MODEL OF SOCIAL COGNITION
in this multistudy analysis presented an uninstructed False Belief
task, in which participants watched videos of an agent witnessing
some but not all events happening in a room, thus developing a
false belief about where a certain object has been placed (e.g.,
inside vs. outside a box). Somewhat similarly, for a meta-analysis
on Visual Perspective Taking (Schurz, Aichhorn, Martin, & Per-
ner, 2013), we found no prominent overlap with any one of our
three clusters (but see Dumontheil, Küster, Apperly, & Blakemore,
2010; Santiesteban, Banissy, Catmur, & Bird, 2012). Visual Per-
spective Taking tasks require participants to judge what another
person can see or how another person sees an object. For a
summary map of studies on the computational modeling of ToM
(Cheong, Jolly, Sul, & Chang, 2017), that is, studies using game-
theoretical approaches to model how individuals engage strategic
reasoning in competitive and cooperative contexts, we observed a
slight preference in overlap with our cognitive cluster and a further
overlap with the intermediate cluster. Finally, for a meta-analysis
on Moral Cognition (Bzdok et al., 2012; see also Eres, Louis, &
Molenberghs, 2018), large overlaps were found for the cognitive
and intermediate clusters and comparatively little for the affective
cluster. Moral Cognition tasks featured scenarios with moral vio-
lations or dilemmas and required participants to make appropriate
judgments on the actions of one individual toward others.
Summary and Conclusion
A Hierarchical Perspective
More than two decades of neuroimaging and behavioral re-
search have produced substantial data and a rich variety of theories
and perspectives on the neurocognitive processes underlying the
human ability to understand other minds. However, there has been
an increasing awareness of disagreement concerning the concepts
and taxonomy underlying social processes (Happé et al., 2017;
Schaafsma et al., 2015; Spunt & Adolphs, 2017). This meta-
analysis aimed to support the development of a coherent and
balanced theoretical model of major cognitive factors underlying
the ability to understand other people’s minds. We have argued
that neuroimaging data provides a good starting point for such a
model, as other sources—such as behavioral data—have yet to
provide a complete picture of task-by-task interrelations. As we
have reviewed in the Behavioral Separability of Tasks From the
Three-Cluster Solution section, behavioral intercorrelations were
only studied for a limited number of tasks, some of which suffer
from range restrictions in scores (e.g., nonimpaired adults showing
ceiling effects in some traditional ToM tasks).
The present meta-analysis used hierarchical clustering to sort
and group neural patterns elicited across a range of empathy and
ToM tasks. Such a hierarchical approach shares characteristics
with previous work conceptualizing social cognition as a multi-
layered or multilevel phenomenon (De Waal, 2012; Preston & De
Waal, 2002; Schaafsma et al., 2015; Singer, 2006). An advantage
of the clustering method applied here is that it provides a data-
driven answer to the question of how many factors or latent
variables are sufficient and appropriate for modeling social cog-
nition. Results suggest the answer is twofold: On the one hand, the
best overall clustering performance was reached when the data
were divided into a three-cluster solution. However, further local
peaks in performance were found when the data were split into
eight and 11 clusters. The higher-level, three-cluster solution pro-
vides a solid foundation of evidence for the assumption that
empathy and ToM share certain processes, and therefore brain
activity, across different tasks and stimuli. However, the concur-
rent existence of an additional lower level of clustering (essentially
by task) highlights the question of the appropriate level of con-
creteness and detail in neurocognitive accounts of social cognition.
Will it be possible to formulate a highly specific mechanism that
can be applied to all tasks and contexts? We rather suggest mod-
eling social cognition by multilevel theories, similar to models in
other fields such as intelligence research. There, some accounts
feature a central construct which reflects a latent variable that
indicates a broader, more abstract neurocognitive function (e.g.,
dynamic control via a multiple-demand network; Duncan, 2013).
Turning to individual tasks specifies how this function manifests in
a concrete context and for a particular problem. Task contexts can
have different degrees of relevance for ecological social cognition.
While some tasks may contain spurious processes related to idio-
syncratic elements of a paradigm (see, e.g., Mar, 2011, for discus-
sion), other tasks may resemble to some extent a real-life problem
(such as trying to guess a person’s mental state based on their
facial expression). Modeling our data as a multilevel construct
accounts for the diversity in how social abilities manifest as well
as for the specific demands placed by its particular instances (e.g.,
in experimental tasks). To illustrate, several accounts have de-
scribed mechanisms targeted at explaining false-belief understand-
ing, which is assumed to be a hallmark of human social cognition
(e.g., Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003;
Wimmer & Perner, 1983). It turns out to be difficult to predict
whether and how these mechanisms are recruited by other social
cognition tasks. For example, how would a mechanism for decou-
pling beliefs from knowledge about reality (e.g., Frith & Frith,
2003) work in the context of a Trait Judgment task? This question
is relevant as meta-analytic maps for False Belief and Trait Judg-
ment tasks showed high similarity (see, e.g., Figure 4A). Our
approach addresses this issue by placing the most situation-
specific mechanisms, such as belief decoupling, at the lower level
of our hierarchical model. Decoupling beliefs represents a specific
implementation of the broader function of self-generated and de-
coupled thought in social cognition (cognitive cluster). The mul-
tilevel perspective accommodates the fact that (a) a mechanism for
decoupling false beliefs is not perfectly applicable to other task
contexts, but (b) a broader functional class of self-generated
thought in social cognition forms the basis for belief decoupling
(but does not completely specify it).
Separated Versus Combined Social Processes
The central novel finding of our three-cluster solution is the inter-
mediate cluster. Our results show that rather than being a distinct
(sub-)form of processing, this cluster combines processes from the
cognitive and affective clusters. Whereas previous labels such as
affective ToM and cognitive empathy claim this process for either the
domain of ToM or empathy, we suggest that referring to this function
as conjoint ToM and empathy provides a more unbiased positioning in
the terminological landscape. Perhaps more important than its termi-
nology, however, is the functional relevance of this cluster. The
cooccurrence of cognitive and affective processes has been linked to
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(2009) demonstrated the relevance of combining cognitive and affec-
tive processes for understanding others. In an fMRI experiment,
participants viewed videos of persons discussing emotional autobio-
graphical events. After filming, the person shown in the video had
been asked to rate their own emotional states during the clip on a
moment-to-moment basis. In addition, participants observing the
scanner were asked to rate what the person in the video likely felt at
each point in time. By comparing the person’s own assessment with
participants’ ratings, an index of empathic accuracy could be gener-
ated. At time points where empathic accuracy of the participants was
high, activation levels were increased both in areas linked to cognitive
(e.g., mPFC, superior temporal sulcus) and affective (e.g., inferior
parietal lobule, premotor cortex) processes. The task by Zaki et al.
(2009) is part of the Evaluating Situated Emotions task group, which
ended up in the intermediate cluster of our analysis.
Another central case of coactivation of cognitive and affective
processes are everyday social interactions, which are essential for
understanding other minds (see Schilbach et al., 2013). For example,
Schilbach, Eickhoff, Mojzisch, and Vogeley (2008) recorded facial
mimicry-related brain activity during online social interactions and
found conjoint activation in the cortical midline (e.g., precuneus) and
motor areas (e.g., precentral gyrus). This pattern of coactivated areas
resembles our intermediate cluster, that is, the combination of cogni-
tive and affective processes. Also, other studies presenting scenes or
videos of social interactions reported a coactivation of cognitive and
affective processes (e.g., Deuse et al., 2016; Wolf, Dziobek, & Heek-
eren, 2010). Note, however, that both naturalistic social cognition (see
Zaki & Ochsner, 2012) and social interaction (Schilbach et al., 2013)
were argued to engage additional processes not covered by the cog-
nitive and affective clusters (e.g., reward-related areas during social
interactions). Another group of tasks where coactivation of cognitive
and affective clusters was observed is altruistic decisions (Hare et al.,
2010; Tusche, Böckler, Kanske, Trautwein, & Singer, 2016; see also
Hein, Silani, Preuschoff, Batson, & Singer, 2010). Tusche et al.
(2016) found that the level of generosity in donations for charitable
organizations was predicted by brain activity patterns in both the right
temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) and right anterior insula during that
task, again indicating a cooccurrence of cognitive and affective pro-
cesses.
Taken together, the reviewed studies suggest that the coactivation
of cognitive and affective processes might have particular relevance
for ecologically valid social cognition. Our meta-analytic clustering
demonstrates that a portion of the tasks typically assumed to measure
either ToM or empathy (the intermediate cluster) engages cognitive
and affective processes concurrently. Furthermore, our review of
behavioral studies showed that in terms of performance, tasks linked
to the intermediate cluster (e.g., social animations) are correlated to
both the cognitive (e.g., strange stories) and affective clusters (e.g.,
facial emotion recognition) tasks. This has implications for selecting
tasks when measuring different aspects of social cognition. In fact,
tasks linked to the intermediate cluster often show good clinical
discrimination, such as the Faux Pas test (e.g., for autism spectrum:
Baron-Cohen, O’Riordan, et al., 1999; frontotemporal dementia:
Gregory et al., 2002; schizophrenia: Konstantakopoulos et al., 2014)
or social animations (e.g., for autism spectrum: White, Coniston,
Rogers, & Frith, 2011; schizophrenia: Bliksted et al., 2019). Although
these findings put the spotlight on tasks from the intermediate cluster
with respect to ecological and clinical relevance, they also trigger a
novel question regarding their interpretation. Because such tasks
contain both cognitive and affective processes, their interindividual
differences could reflect different sources—a difference in cognitive
processes only, affective processes only, or both (combined). There-
fore, we suggest to select tasks according to the three-cluster solution
identified in this meta-analysis and ideally present a combination of
them (cognitive, affective, and intermediate), because this may in-
crease the ability to evaluate separate as well as conjoint social
processes.
Outlook
The capacity to understand what other people think and feel re-
mains one of the most elusive mental faculties. We have summarized
neuroimaging research from more than two decades (188 studies,
4,207 subjects), based on which we propose to model social cognition
as a hierarchical multilevel construct. Thereby, we are seeking to
accommodate the diversity of processes and features of social cogni-
tion (on a lower level), while making explicit a level of coherence
among them (i.e., a higher level). Based on our research focus and the
evidence available to date, this meta-analysis has produced a first
sample of processes, levels, and mechanisms that such a model might
have. At the highest level of our model, we suggest to capture
social-cognitive processes in terms of two overarching networks
which are flexibly combined and relate to more sensory-affective
versus more abstract and decoupled representations of others’ mental
states.
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